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Abstract:  The paper analyzes the size of the GPG in enterpris s located in 
Poland and with at least 10 employees. For this purpose a linear model is 
constructed for individual data that allows to distinguish the influence of sex, 
occupation and education on the earnings. That allows t  explain the size of 
income discrepancies caused by external, objective factors and assess the 
magnitude of sex discrimination.  
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MEASUREMENT OF GENDER PAY GAP  
Introductory remarks  
Official statistics publish Gender Pay Gap (GPG) on the basis of Structure of 
Earnings Survey which is carried out in Poland every two years. Calculated values 
are presented by Eurostat in separate tables for six age classes, private and public 
ownership, for full and part timers and for economic activities used in statistical 
classification according to NACE Rev. 2. Gender Pay Gap calculated for such 
aggregations may be misleading and gives poor insight into possible salary 
discrimination. For instance in particular sections women and men may be 
polarized in different occupations. Aggregated GPG cannot also explain the 
influence of additional factors such as job experience and education level. As  
a result virtual GPG in the micro level remains unknown.  
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Gender pay gap in mainstream economics  
Differences in wages between men and women have not been an extended 
field of research in mainstream economics. In the classic economics maximum 
incomes appear when marginal productivity of labour equals real wage. The lower 
the real wage the more the enterprise may employ at a benefit. Real wages 
automatically adjust to the supply and demand for wrk. In the classical model it is 
assured by assumptions of perfectly competitive markets, flexible prices and full 
information. In such world wage discrimination is not possible. Companies will 
simply pay wages to men and to women to the amount that maximizes the 
companies’ income. Exceptions in the model are allowed but they are never 
permanent. Keynes models and articles also do not refer to possible wage 
discrimination. It is so because Keynes revolution was especially designed against 
the idea of voluntary unemployment advocated by the classics. Keynes himself did 
not bother about wage discrimination. Much more serious was for him the idea that 
the overall demand may be not sufficient to guarantee full employment. Elastic 
nominal nor real wages were for him not a proper solution for curing economy 
diseased with involuntary unemployment. Monetarist revolution neither addressed 
the possible wage discrimination. For monetarists the key issue was to control the 
inflation, to control the money supply and to limit state activity to a necessary 
minimum. New Classical Economics followed the steps of old classics and by 
imposing assumptions of rational expectations, by imposing that individuals 
maximize utility – companies maximize profits and by assuming that full and 
relevant information is available it also excludes the possibility of wage 
discrimination. Production and employment fluctuations are explained mainly by 
unexpected money supply changes which probably affect both women and men 
with the same strength. Rational expectations, flexib  prices and only voluntary 
unemployment in the Real Convergence Cycle Theory also do not emphasize wage 
discrimination. Exogenous productivity shocks presumably influence male and 
female’s level of wages equivalently. With some help of shedding the light on 
possible wage discrepancies comes New Keynesian Ecoomics. It raised from the 
Keynesian economics in response to its weaknesses, e pecially to the one which is 
particularly important for the purposes of this article: lack of proper micro 
foundations. New keynesian economists believe that classical microeconomics is 
not relevant in real, complex environment. New Keynesians inhabit the theoretical 
world with imperfect competition, incomplete markets, heterogeneous labour force 
and asymmetric information. In this micro area one may search for explanations of 
differences in individual wages. However as most of the models describe variety of 
reasons, seldom can they successfully deal with distinction between male and 
female’s earnings. Implicit Contracts explain what might be the cause of Walras’ 
Auction’s Mechanism disfunction in the labour market as wages often diverge 
from marginal efficiency of labour. Besides other flaws of this model (for instance: 
in times of economic downturn the model does not predict redundancies) it is not 
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clear at all why women ought to have less profitable implicit contracts than men. 
The Efficiency-Wage Theory would justify those differences but only on the basis 
that men on average do work more efficiently than women and that is why men are 
allowed by the market forces to earn more. Selections models ground the existence 
of wages above market clearing rate by claiming that higher wages are an excellent 
incentive to lure better and more efficient employees and so to reduce high costs of 
doing business (interviews, redundancies of ineffici nt employees etc.). According 
to those models wage discrepancies between man and woman may appear if men 
are on average better employees than women. Possible cause for this may be the 
assumption that men are on average better educated or that on average they have 
broader or longer job experience. Dubious is the explanation of shirking models 
that men need to be paid on average more than women to ensure the quality of their 
efforts. Minimizing turnover again seems to apply to males and females with the 
same attitude. Even sociological theories that emphasize the importance of fairness 
and higher wages for increasing morale and raising productivity are helpless to 
explain GPG. Besides recent criticism of Efficiency-Wage Theory that it denials 
some basic facts that those who are most efficient, valuable for society do not earn 
most at all and quite opposite, those who contributed to the subprime crisis by 
irresponsible banking policy got high wages and received in reward enormous 
bonuses, the Efficiency-Wage Theory turned out to help implicitly to isolate some 
factors that might be responsible for the gap betwen male and female’s wages. 
Those could be level of finished education, job experience and individual, 
sociological characteristics affecting efficiency of labour and thus wages. Some 
additional  ideas about the GPG indicator may come from Insider-Outsider model 
as it has implications for the structure of unemployment. Higher wages in this 
model result from exploiting by employees the economic rent which is generated 
by turnover costs. Higher wages may get employees with longer job experience 
and those who negotiate more aggressively and efficiently. As for mentioned 
models objective causes of the pay gap could be education, job experience, 
productivity and traits of character. The last sociologic variable could be of certain 
importance1 as men may have different patterns in society and it can influence their 
more “aggressive” behavior at the labour market. However it is not easy to measure 
features of character. In the article it is assumed that this factor is insignificant.  
It could be argued that in modern societies patterns of both men and women 
become similar and that women have the same goals as men in the labour market. 
However this issue is not measured in this article and needs more research 
especially in the sociologic grounds. As a replacement for this variable it is 
desirable to take into account a responsibility that an individual has on his/her post. 
                                                 
1 Zon np. Leibbrandt A., List J.A. (2012) Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? 
Evidence From A Large Scale Natural Field Experiment, NBER Working Paper,  No. 
18511, 2012. 
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The higher the responsibility and the complexity of tasks the higher the wage ought 
to be.   
Summing up, if men are on average better educated, have longer job 
experience, are more productive, have more desirable traits of character and carry 
out more responsible and complex tasks they should earn more. In such case there 
is no wage discrimination. Only objective reasons explain the pay gap.2 However if 
these objective explanatory variables do not help to explain the differences of 
women’s and men’s wages then we might have a situation of gender pay 
discrimination, which could be defined as a situation where one sex earns higher 
wages than opposite sex without any objective causes.  
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL  
Official statistics and empirical analyses of GPG   
According to Eurostat on the basis of Structure of Earnings Survey, GPG in 
industry, construction and services (except public administration, defence, 
compulsory social security) in Poland represented by the difference between 
average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female paid 
employees as a percentage of average gross hourly ea nings of male paid 
employees accounted for merely 4.5% in 2010. It turned out to be a significant 
drop as in 2008 GPG indicator equaled 11.4%. The indicator was slightly different 
in industry, construction and services except activities of households as employers 
and extra-territorial organizations and bodies. GPG in 2010 amounted to 4.9% and 
in 2008 to 11.1%. Such values in 2010 seem low in comparison to other European 
countries. Developed countries, among which one could list for instance Germany 
22.2%, United Kingdom 20.1%, Austria 23.7% had signif cantly higher numbers. 
Neighbors of Poland from socialistic block also arein much worse situation – 
Czech Republic 21.0%, Estonia 27.3%, Latvia 13.6%, Lithuania 11.9%, Slovakia 
20.5%. Much higher than Poland’s outcome is the average GPG for UE (16.2%) 
and for the Euro area (16.3%) too. Among countries for which data are available, 
only Slovenia (2.3%) and Italy have small GPG, in the first case lower than GPG 
for Poland and in the second case similar to polish GPG. Such small GPG for 
Poland and high for most of other  countries raises crucial questions and doubts. 
Explanation for these discrepancies between countries could be that in Poland 
woman are simply less discriminated than in other Eu opean countries. Other 
possible interpretation is that there might be in fact no discrimination as wage 
differences in particular countries result from objective factors. This interpretation 
may be grounded by family patterns. In Poland in most cases both parents work 
                                                 
2 For possible objective reasons of GPG see for example: Amaram D.I. (2010) The gender 
pay gap: Review and update, China-USA Business Review, Volume 9, No.6 (Serial 
No.84). 
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full time. One of the reason might be their pursuit to maintain certain level of living 
standard. Contrary to Poland, in Germany, where purchasing power of average 
income is higher, women were often interested only i  part-time job. This could 
have influenced the level of GPG as usually (except for high specialists) part-
timers earn less than full-timers. Among other objectiv  factors on the basis of 
economic theory mentioned earlier influencing GPG leve  in European countries 
could be that men are on average better educated, have longer job experience, are 
more productive, have more desirable traits of characte  and carry out more 
responsible tasks. This would mean however that woman in Poland are on average 
better educated, have longer job experience, are more productive, have more 
desirable traits of character and carry out more responsible tasks than their female 
colleagues from other countries. That however seems not plausible to become the 
responsible cause for such huge differences between cou tries. This leaves us with 
two possibilities: either woman in Poland are less discriminated or they are more 
valuable for employers due to certain reason. Third possibility is that GPG 
calculated for aggregated values might not measure the discrimination effect 
correctly. Official statistics publish Gender Pay Gap (GPG) on the basis of 
Structure of Earnings Survey which is carried out in Poland every two years. 
Calculated values are presented by Eurostat in separat  tables for six age classes, 
private and public ownership, for full and part timers and for economic activities 
used in statistical classification according to NACE Rev. 2. Gender Pay Gap 
calculated for such aggregations may be misleading and gives poor insight into 
possible salary discrimination. For instance in particular sections sexes may be 
polarized in different occupations. A good example is construction. In this section 
men usually do simple works and can be accounted for so called middle staff while 
woman employed in this section generally concentrate in specialists posts. Average 
wages differ from each other in those groups so the wage discrepancies not 
necessarily imply that any sex is discriminated even within this one section. It can 
be taken almost for granted that aggregated GPG for all sections, that is for whole 
country, will be heavily biased. Moreover the issue raised above is not the only 
reason for the bias. Aggregated GPG can neither explain the influence of additional 
factors, such as job experience and education level. As a result it is doubtful that 
officially published GPG is significant in the micro level. It should be treated only 
as an introductory value which limits ought to be known before drawing 
conclusions about possible wage discrimination in particular countries. To estimate 
the level of discrimination and the “less unbiased” value of GPG it is unavoidable 
to construct an econometric model. For this purpose a linear model for Poland is 
constructed that allows to distinguish the influence of sex, occupation and 
education (and other variables, see next chapter) in individual companies on the 
earnings. That allows to explain the size of income discrepancies caused by 
external, objective factors and assess the magnitude of sex discrimination.  
There are other papers that measure and quantify GPG. Paper of Adamchik 
and Bedi measure using different methodologies and specifications estimated GPG 
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for Poland. They support the view that most of the explained wage gap can be 
attributed to industrial and occupational segregation. However they still find that 
substantial fraction (between 40-50%) of the wage gap (estimated to amount to  
21-22%) remains unexplained.3  The existence of GPG both in formal and informal 
Poland’s economy proved M. Rokicka and A. Ruzik (2010). They found that the 
inequality of earnings between unregistered women and men is bigger at the 
bottom of the earnings distribution. In the case of formal employees, the inequality 
at the top of the distributions tends to increase.4 Even within homogenous group of 
national MBA’s, detailed demographic, family, and human capital measures 
explained only 58 percent of the raw gender wage gap equaled 15.5%, claim 
Grove, Hussey and Jetter (2011). Authors proved that experiences, noncognitive 
skills, and priorities distinctly influenced men's and women's outcomes. After 
including extended set of covariates, the unexplained gap shrinked to merely 6.1 
percent at the 25th percentile, 4.3 percent at the 50th percentile, and only 1.3 
percent at the 75th percentile.5 Similar outcomes (while not taking into account sof
skills) concerning magnitude of discrimination, but for completely other sample – 
for south Italy citizens, obtained Giaimo, Bono and Magno (2007). According to 
their research 35,9% of wage differential can be attributed to discrimination.6  
O’Darchai (2011) compared GPG among chosen occupations and their 
subcategories (group of legislators, senior officials and managers) for 23 European 
Countries. He found that in Poland within this high-qualified group of professions 
GPG is relatively stronger and wage inequality greater than in chosen sample 
(30.95%). The total, average wage gap for Poland on the basis of data from year 
2006 the author estimated to the amount of 17.03% [O’Darchai 2011]. N. Catia 
using quantile regression and counterfactual decomposition methods showed that 
wage gap is positive in each Mediterranean country. He found that the most part of 
it is composed of discrimination effect, while the characteristics effect is small 
[Catia, 2009]. All the papers regardless of the time, region, population sample 
indicate that GPG exists and that there always remains  fraction that cannot be 
explained by objective causes. This magnitude of discrimination amounts from few 
percents (while taking into consideration also softkills) to circa 40%. It is crucial 
to answer whether the unexplained gap calculated by Adamchik and Bedi (2001) 
has shrinked in Poland since year 1996. It is also important to compare result 
                                                 
3 Adamchik V.A., Bedi A.S. (2001) Persistence Of The G nder Pay Differential in  
a Transition Economy, ISS Working Paper, No.349., Hague: Institute of Social Studies. 
4 Rokicka M., Ruzik A. (2010) The Gender Pay Gap In Informal Employment in Poland, 
Case Network Studies and Analyses, No.406, Warszawa. 
5 Grove W.A., Hussey A., Jetter M. (2011) The Gender Pay Gap Beyond Human Capital, 
Heterogeneity in Noncognitive Skills and in Labor Market Tastes, The Journal of Human 
Resources. 
6 Giaimo R., Bono F., Magno (2007), Interpreting the D composition of the Gender 
Earnings Gap, new.sis-statistica.org. 
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obtained by the model and simple GPG calculated by Eurostat to draw proper 
conclusions about usefulness of this measure. 
In the paper, GPG is estimated as a differential betwe n logarithms of men’s 
and women’s arithmetic hourly average wages: )ln()ln( km WW − . The calculated 
indicator may be decomposed into two effects: a discrimination effect and an 
equipment effect. Equipment effect represents the fraction of the wage gap 
explained by particular characteristics of men and women. The unexplained part is 
called the discrimination effect and might be treated as potential discrimination. 
The discrimination effect consists of sum of discrimination on men’s behalf and the 
discrimination on women’s behalf. To measure each effect one must use the 






*** βββββ −++−+−=−  
where: 
mW  – average men’s hourly wage, 
kW – average women’s hourly wage, 
mX – vector of average men’s characteristics, 
kX  – vector of average women’s characteristics, 
mβ̂  –  coefficient vector of men´s wage function, 
kβ̂  –  coefficient vector of women´s wage function, 
*β̂  –  coefficient vector of the equilibrium wage (non-discriminatory wage). 
Functions’ men’s and women’s wage coefficients are estimated on the basis 
of the estimator of classical least square method: 
 ln(Wm) − ln(Wk ) = (Xm − Xk )β̂
* + (β̂ m − β̂ * )Xm + +(β̂
* − β̂ k )Xk   (1) 
 )ln()(
ˆ 1 WXXX TT −=β   (2) 
where:X  is a matrix of observations of independent variables representing 
employees’ characteristics, )ln(W is a vector of hourly wages’ natural logarithms.     
The expression *ˆ)( βkm XX − from equation (1) represents the part of GPG 
which is explained by characteristics of men and women. This part is called the 
equipment effect. It comes from the word „equipped” as both men and women can 
be appropriately equipped in experience, human capital etc. which allows to 




m XX )ˆˆ()ˆˆ( ** ββββ −++− represents the unexplained 
fraction of the wage gap. This is the discrimination effect. 
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Key problem rests on determining the function of equilibrium wage. Reimers 
(1983) uses as parameters of the equilibrium wage function arithmetical average of 







βββ +=  (3) 









where: mn  and kn are respectively number of men and women in the sample of 
employees. 
Neumark (1988) estimates regression coefficients of the equilibrium wage 
function together for men and for women: 
 ln(W) = X β̂ * + u  (5) 
where:  is a vector of random variables. 
In the paper equilibrium wage was determined on the basis of all three 
approaches. 
Data used for analysis  
Coefficients of the econometric models were estimated using the data from 
Structure of Earnings urvey, a research carried out in Poland every two years on 
the statistical form Z-12 Sprawozdanie o strukturze wynagrodzeń według zawodów. 
Last available data come from edition of the survey for October 2010.   
Explanatory variables that are incorporated into wage functions vary across 
different studies. In most studies it is assumed that variables affecting wages are: 
education, experience, working position, industry, esponsibility, duty, the 
company size, number of years worked in the company, l bour union membership, 
region, marital status and number of children.7  In the article as explanatory 
variables were taken: region (represented for Poland by 16 voivodships), size of the 
company (small for less than 10 employees, medium for between 10 and 49 
employees and big for more than 49 employees), way of determining wages, 
working position represented by 9 separate classes with different duties and 
responsibilities, completed education, type of employment contract, working time 
system, age, length of job experience, contract type (full or part-time), sector of 
                                                 
7 Hedija V., Musil P. (2010), Genderová Mzdová Mezera, Working paper CVKS, Brno: 
Ekonomicko-Správní Fakulta MU, (issn 1801-4496),  Hedija V., Musil P. (2011) Gender 
Pay Gap – Application In The Specific Enterprise, Rview Of Economic Perspectives – 
národohospodářský obzor, Vol. 11, issue 4. 
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activity (public or private), place of job (if in headquarters or not) and type of 
economic activity. Data for marital status and number of children were unavailable. 
It is impossible to incorporate into the model all the dummy variables 
describing particular characteristics due to their d chotomy, which causes 
colinearity with intercept in the models. To eliminate this effect, one of the 
variables within certain characteristics was omitted. Variables excluded from the 
models are called reference variables and they are bolded in Table 1. 
Table 1. Set of independent variables  
Voivodship 
WOJ.02 dolnośląskie WOJ.18 podkarpackie 
WOJ.04 kujawsko-pomorskie WOJ.20 podlaskie 
WOJ.06 lubelskie WOJ.22 pomorskie 
WOJ.08 lubuskie WOJ.24 śląskie 
WOJ.10 łódzkie WOJ.26 świętokrzyskie 
WOJ.12 małopolskie WOJ.28 warmińsko-mazurskie 
WOJ.14 mazowieckie WOJ.30 wielkopolskie 
WOJ.16 opolskie WOJ.32 zachodniopomorskie 
Size of the entity 
MALE small DUZE big 
SREDNIE middle-size   
Way of determining earnings 
SUW1 settlements regulated 
by group of entities 
SUW3 on the basis of other 
regulations 
SUW2 labour settlements 
within the company 
  
Profession groups 
ZAW1 Politicians, higher 
Officials and 
managers 
ZAW6 Farmers, Gardeners, 
Fishermen and Foresters  
ZAW2 Specialists ZAW7 Manufactury Workers and 
Craftsmen 
ZAW3 Technicians and middle 
staff 
ZAW8 Fitters and Machine 
Operators 
ZAW4 Office employees ZAW9 Simple work employees 





WYKSZ_WY higher  WYKSZ_ZZ basic vocational 
Cont. on the next page 
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Table 1. (cont.) Set of independent variables 
WYKSZ_PO post-secondary WYKSZ_GM gimnasium 
WYKSZ_SZ secondary vocational WYKSZ_PP elementary and not full 
elementary 
WYKSZ_SO general secondary   
Type of employment contract 
RUOP1 for indefinite duration ROUP3 till the time of finishing 
ordered job 
RUOP2 for definite duration RUOP4 probation 
Working Time System 
SCP10 basic SCP50 weekend job 
SCP20 balanced SCP60 shortened week 
SCP30 intermittent time system SCP70 constant job 
SCP40 task system    
Age 
WIEK 
Number of years in specific company 
STAZ 
Contract type 
PEŁNY full-time NIEPEŁNY part-time  
Sector 
PUBLICZNY public PRYWATNY private  
Job in 
headquarters  
   
SIEDZIBA 
Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community, Rev. 2 
SEK_A Agriculture, Forestry 
And Fishing 
SEK_K Financial And Insurance 
Activities 
SEK_B Mining And Quarrying SEK_L Real Estate Activiies 
SEK_C Manufacturing SEK_M Professional, Scientific 
And Technical Activities 
SEK_D Electricity, Gas, Steam 
And Air Conditioning 
Supply 
SEK_N Administrative And 
Support Service Activities 








SEK_F Construction SEK_P Education 
SEK_G Wholesale And Retail 
Trade; Repair Of Motor 
Vehicles And 
Motorcycles 
SEK_Q Human Health And Social 
Work Activities 
Cont. on the next page 
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Table 1. (cont.) Set of independent variables 
SEK_H Transportation And 
Storage 
SEK_R Arts, Entertainment And 
Recreation 
SEK_I Accommodation 
And Food Service 
Activities 
SEK_S Other Service Activities 
SEK_J Information And 
Communication 
  
Source: own work  
Functions’ men’s and women’s wage coefficients estima ed on the basis of 
the estimator of classical least square method are presented in Table 2. All the 
variables turned out to be statistically significant t the level of at least 10%. 
Table 2. Wage functions parameters and average valus of independent variables  
 Men Women Total Average M Average W 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
const 3.4546 3.1297 3.3069      1      1 
WON02 -0.0942 -0.1090 -0.1077 0.08051 0.08226 
WON04 -0.1749 -0.1402 -0.1623 0.05010 0.05043 
WON06 -0.2285 -0.1840 -0.2049 0.04157 0.04770 
WON08 -0.1843 -0.1447 -0.1731 0.02300 0.02434 
WON10 -0.1717 -0.1325 -0.1550 0.05486 0.05994 
WON12 -0.1460 -0.1254 -0.1388 0.07811 0.08829 
WON16 -0.1687 -0.1391 -0.1580 0.02053 0.02106 
WON18 -0.2329 -0.1793 -0.2049 0.05250 0.05003 
WON20 -0.1464 -0.1421 -0.1485 0.02497 0.02875 
WON22 -0.0850 -0.0888 -0.0905 0.05296 0.05235 
WON24 -0.1020 -0.1245 -0.1152 0.15072 0.12023 
WON26 -0.2187 -0.1686 -0.1915 0.02636 0.02490 
WON28 -0.1792 -0.1623 -0.1755 0.02955 0.03403 
WON30 -0.1370 -0.1195 -0.1319 0.09977 0.09662 
WON32 -0.1483 -0.1285 -0.1445 0.02868 0.03644 
DUZE 0.3407 0.1576 0.2459 0.79304 0.71505 
SREDNIE 0.1474 0.0919 0.1243 0.19841 0.26894 
SUW2 -0.0218 -0.0274 -0.0224 0.46933 0.35376 
SUW3 -0.0334 -0.0204 -0.0255 0.48403 0.58691 
ZAW2 -0.2918 -0.0923 -0.1979 0.19041 0.38199 
ZAW3 -0.4822 -0.3697 -0.4426 0.10142 0.12693 
ZAW4 -0.6531 -0.4714 -0.5857 0.06215 0.11707 
ZAW5 -0.7754 -0.6037 -0.7238 0.07362 0.11035 
ZAW6 -0.7468 -0.6976 -0.7134 0.00323 0.00138 
ZAW7 -0.6281 -0.5860 -0.5449 0.22849 0.04351 
ZAW8 -0.6051 -0.4649 -0.5100 0.19128 0.03982 
Cont. on the next page 
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Table 2.  (cont.) Wage functions parameters and average values of independent variables  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
ZAW9 -0.7674 -0.7432 -0.7843 0.06774 0.11085 
WYKSZ_PO -0.2383 -0.2767 -0.2687 0.03483 0.06978 
WYKSZ_SZ -0.2559 -0.3264 -0.2881 0.23311 0.19206 
WYKSZ_SO -0.2620 -0.2927 -0.2893 0.06857 0.09020 
WYKSZ_ZZ -0.3292 -0.4077 -0.3649 0.31112 0.13736 
WYKSZ_GM -0.3557 -0.2053 -0.2956 0.00183 0.00042 
WYKSZ_PP -0.3598 -0.4083 -0.3934 0.05863 0.04449 
RUOP2 -0.1511 -0.1212 -0.1453 0.25647 0.22969 
RUOP3 -0.0625 -0.1259 -0.0750 0.00401 0.00267 
RUOP4 -0.2635 -0.1937 -0.2339 0.00732 0.00625 
SCP20 0.0000 0.0104 0.0000 0.14137 0.14583 
SCP30 -0.2245 -0.1029 -0.2055 0.00183 0.00029 
SCP40 0.1877 0.1650 0.2011 0.02520 0.01410 
SCP60 0.0000 0.1485 0.0796 0.00048 0.00025 
SCP70 0.1123 0.1105 0.1495 0.01887 0.00252 
PELNY 0.0128 -0.0417 -0.0188 0.94547 0.90559 
SEKTOR 0.0184 0.0521 0.0363 0.37618 0.60002 
SIEDZIBA -0.0569 0.0066 -0.0246 0.85212 0.88657 
WIEK 0.0025 0.0064 0.0038 40.8340 40.8570 
STAZ_WJS 0.0058 0.0052 0.0055 9.77520 10.6180 
SEK_A 0.0565 0.0732 0.1247 0.01428 0.00510 
SEK_B 0.4471 0.3590 0.5668 0.04392 0.00522 
SEK_C 0.0000 0.0360 0.0601 0.31342 0.14793 
SEK_D 0.1772 0.2257 0.2799 0.03545 0.00989 
SEK_E 0.0174 0.0434 0.1054 0.02457 0.00692 
SEK_F -0.0063 -0.0374 0.0944 0.07608 0.01031 
SEK_G 0.0000 0.0158 0.0429 0.10059 0.11258 
SEK_H -0.0539 0.0524 0.0476 0.08213 0.03354 
SEK_I -0.0490 0.0000 0.0000 0.00690 0.01215 
SEK_J 0.1395 0.1332 0.1838 0.02628 0.01543 
SEK_K 0.1713 0.1355 0.1411 0.02027 0.04580 
SEK_L 0.0000 0.0752 0.0733 0.01211 0.01326 
SEK_M -0.0114 0.0454 0.0438 0.02300 0.02462 
SEK_N -0.3229 -0.0631 -0.1541 0.03754 0.02602 
SEK_P 0.1230 0.2164 0.2045 0.09189 0.27403 
SEK_Q -0.0985 -0.0932 -0.1045 0.03125 0.13719 
SEK_R -0.1131 -0.1176 -0.0903 0.01152 0.01512 
SEK_S -0.1286 -0.0800 -0.0885 0.00165 0.00235 
Source: own calculations  
Next, according to presented methodology there were calculated equipment 
and discrimination effects for three possible equilibrium wages. Estimated GPG for 
Poland turned out to be equal merely 1.85%. It means that however men on 
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average receive higher wages than women. The differenc  between average wages 
is relatively small. To answer the question of discrimination existence and its 
magnitude one must compare equipment effect and discrimination effect.  













Reimers -0.1269 0.1454 0.0916 0.0537 0.0185 
Cotton -0.1275 0.1460 0.0931 0.0529 0.0185 
Neumark -0.0829 0.1013 0.0515 0.0499 0.0185 
Source: own calculations  
Figure1. Equipment effect and discrimination effect as a percentage of GPG 
Source: own calculations 
Equipment effect represents in Poland -690% to -480% of existing GPG. 
This is the part explained by different, objective, taken into the model 
characteristics of men and women. Negative values of the equipment effect can be 
explained by claiming that women have on average bett r characteristics than men, 
so women should earn higher wages in comparison to men. However one must 
notice that discrimination effect is positive and a little smaller than equipment 
effect. The unexplained by objective factors difference of men’s and woman’s 
wages is of similar magnitude. It means that objectiv  factors explain less than 
50% of the wage differences of the adjusted for objective variables GPG. Rest, the 
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discrimination on men's behalf discrimination  on women's behalf
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is a sum of favoritism of men (accounted for 5% to 9%) and a pure discrimination 
component accounted to be equal 5%. Women have on average 5 to 9% lower 
wages than men, because men are treated more favorably in the labour market. It is 
however not clear whether to treat it as discrimination. However the model 
indicated that women receive ca. 5% lower wages due to pure discrimination 
component. It means that lower by 5% wages are caused only by the fact that they 
are women. It is obvious that such outcome indicates nd measures the magnitude 
of discrimination. However if to treat favoritism of men and pure discrimination 
component together as a general sex discrimination, we can summarize in 
simplification that women get wages lower than men’s wages by 10.13% to 14.6% 
due to discrimination. However the level of discrimination might be little lower as 
a result of sociological, psychological and social factors that were not taken into 
account for the decomposition. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It was proved in the research that aggregated, unadj ste  GPG 
calculated by Eurostat may differ significantly from the GPG adjusted for 
objective determinants of wages. Research carried out in the paper indicate 
that simple GPG indicator is not capable of detecting discrimination of 
wages between women and men. According to unadjuste GPG for Poland 
discrimination of wages was relatively small in 2010. GPG calculated using 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is also not an appropriate measure of 
discrimination of wages between women and men. According to this GPG 
potential discrimination would have been very low in 2010. However results 
of carried out Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition show that woman in Poland 
are better „equipped” for market needs and should earn more. That is why 
GPG itself might be low, but even though the discrimination exists. The 
analysis proves that in simplification women in Poland receive on average 
from 10.1% to 14.6% lower wages in comparison to men as a result of 
potential discrimination. However the level of virtual discrimination might 
be little lower due to sociological, psychological and social factors that were 
not taken into account for the decomposition. The pure discrimination 
component equals ca. 5%. 
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